- it is enforceable
- it contains provision for resolving deadlock and
- it provides for termination in specified circumstances and sets out the consequences of any such termination
In an incorporated JV deadlock can arise either at board level where the directors appointed by the Shareholders take opposite views in a 50:50 JV or in one where unanimity is required, or at shareholder level (and the same would apply to an unincorporated JV) in relation to matters which require shareholder approval.
Obviously it is best to try to avoid the potential for deadlock at the outset. This can be achieved in a number of ways including- agreeing that one party should have a casting vote
- agreeing that a particular party should have control over certain specified issues or areas - this sometimes works well where each party is contributing different things to the JV
- delegation by the JV parties to individuals within the JV management
- restricting the matters which need to be referred to the shareholders
However, many parties will be reluctant to concede the right to "agree" major decisions. Therefore the potential for deadlock on key issues still normally exists. Some people consider the in-built potential deadlock of a 50:50 JV agreement (eg through equality of voting rights at board and shareholder level) in itself provides the strongest structure for encouraging settlement and a common policy between the parties. They argue that the potentially severe commercial consequences of an isoluble deadlock generally ensures that a sensible compromise will be agreed. I do not agree. When a problem arises it is usually because the partners have fallen out and the good - will to resolve the problem has rarely been present. It needs to be broken by one means or another.
Generally there are 2 means of resolving deadlock- Mechanism which allow the JV to continue (Dispute Resolution Mechanism)
- Mechanism which terminate the JV
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